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RECENT IMPORTANT DECISIONS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-TAXATION-Pum.1c PURPos£.-Rev. St. Me. 1903,
c. 4. sec. 87, authorized any municipality to establish a permanent wood, coal,
and fuel yard for the purpose of selling wood, coal, and fuel to its inhabitants
at cost. Held, not to violate the Fourteenth Amendment. Jones v. City of
Portland (U. S., 19I7), 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. u2.
When the act was attacked as a violation of the state constitution, the
Maine court declared such an establishment to be a public purpose. Laughlfo
v. City of Portland, III Me. 486, SI L. R. A. (N. S.) u43, Ann. Cas. I9I6 C,
:'34- Yet in regard to eminent domain, generating and transmitting electricity
bad been held not a public use. Brow1i v. Gerald, 100 Me. 35I. Contra, Jones
v. N. Ga. Electric Co., 125 Ga. 6I8. The reasoning used in the Laughlin Case,
4«Pra, is followed now both in considering heat to be "as indispensable to
the health and comfort of the people as light or water" and in seeing no
ground for objection in the means used to distribute heat. The contrary view
would seem to assert that the means used is of vital importance. Opinion of
the Justices, I55 Mass. 5g8; Opinion of the Justices, I82 Mass. 6o5; Opinion
of the Justices, 2u Mass. 624; Maker v. Grand Rapids, I42 Mich. 687. Decisions as to what is a public use in questions about eminent domain are involved in the same conflict. Minn. Canal & Power Co. v. Koochiching Co.,
97 Minn. 429; Rockingham Co. Light & Power Co. v. Hobbs, 72 N. H. 531.
It also occurs in regard to occupations affected with a public interest, a matter which bas been in dispute since Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. u3. Each bears
witness to the influence of developing public needs and a developing public
opinion. I7 YAI.£ L. J. I62. The line of development is perhaps indicated
by recent decisions allowing a municipality to furnish ice and to supply natural gas for heating. Holton v. Camilla, I34 Ga. 56o; State v. Toledo, ~
Ohio St. II2. Municipal theaters and moving picture theaters have not yet
been allowed. State v. Lynch, 88 Ohio St. 71; I2 MICH. L. R. 132; Egan v.
San Francisco, 165 Cal. 576.
CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW-TRADING STA'.MP STATUTES.-Defendant objected
to the constitutionality of a statute under which he was indicted for issuing,
without license, trading stamps to merchants, "to use with the sale of goods,
entitling the purchaser receiving the same with such sale to procure, free of
charge, premiums from a special stock selected by the defendant's company.
'fhe license fee was assumed prohibitive by the court. Held, constitutional
both as to Federal and State Constitutions. State v. Wilson (Kan., I9I7),
I68 Pac. 679.
Some form of repressive legislation against trading stamps has been
undertaken in a majority of the states, and the Parliament of Canada has
prohibited their use. State v. Wilson, supra. In a majority of jurisdictions these statutes have been held unconstitutional. E~ Parle Dre~el, 147
Cal. 763; 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 588; State v. Sperry and H. Co., 94 Nebr. 785;
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49 L. R. A. (N. S.) u23; People v. Sperry and H. Co. (Mich., 1917), 164
N. W. 503. The principal ground of these decisions is that such statutes
are an unjust suppression of a legitimate method of advertising, and not
of a scheme involving elements of lottery. Trading stamp statutes have been
upheld in Dist. of Columbia v. Kraft, 35 App. D. C., 253; 30 L. R. A. (N. S.)
957; State v. Pitney, &1 Wash. 6gg; overruling Leonard v. Bassindale, 46
Wash. 301; Rast v. Van Deman and Lewis Co., 240 U. S. 342, L. R. A.
1917A 421; Ann. Cases 1917B 455; Tanner v. Little Id. 36g; Pitney v. Washington, Id. 387; and State v. Wilson (supra). Most of the more recent decisions have upheld these statutes primarily on the contention that it was
not unreasonable to say that the trading stamp business involves elements
of lottery, and that it is not merely advertising. "Advertising is identification and description, apprising of quality and place. It has no other object
than to draw attention to the article to be sold." Ta11ner v. Little (supra).
It is to be noted that there is some diversity among the statutes which may
justify some of the diversity in the decisions. In Humes v. City of Little
Rock, 138 Fed. 929, the court said the case of Lansburgh v. District of ColtJmbia, I I App. Cases 512, holding the statute there constitutional, was clearly distinguishable. "The Act of Congress governing the District prescribes
what is meant by gift enterprises and its definition precisely covers the trading stamp concern. That definition is not binding here
* Then too the
court in that case lays stress on the fact that the holder of the stamps could
get nothing unless he accumulated stamps representing purchases to the
extent of $99, and as few did that it was held the uncertainty of ever getting
anything on the stamps introduced an element of chance. No such element
exists in the case at bar." In State v. Ramseyer, 73 N. H. 31, the court said
in distinguishing the case before.it: "The case of Humes v. Fort Smith, 93
Fed. Rep. 857, relates to a regulation, not the prohibition, of the stamp business." See also People v. Sperry and H. <:;o., (supra). Also ordinances
relating to trading stamps will more readily be held unconstitutional under the
more strict construction by the courts of the terms of the grants of powers
to municipalities than of the terms of the grant of powers to the legislature
in the state constitution. State v. Wilson,: supra.

**

CoRPORA'tIONS - FoRtIGN CoRPORA'tloNs - Dorne BusIN£SS W1'tHIN 'tHE
S'tA't:e-CoRl'ORA't:e FRANCHISE TAx.-The Revised Statutes of Texas, 19n,
imposed a franchise tax on any foreign corporation, as a condition to its
right to do business in Texas, of a given percentage of all of the corporation's capital and surplus, representing all its property wherever situated,
and all of its business both intrastate and interstate, thereby placing a tax
on the corporation's property beyond the jurisdiction of the state for taxation purposes. Held, the statute was unconstitutional because it imposed a
burden on interstate commerce and because of want of due process. Looney
v. Crane Co., (1917); 38 Sup. Ct. 85.
It is within the power of the state to levy an excise tax for the privilege
of permitting a foreign corporation to exercise its franchise within the state.
Maine v. Grand Trunk Ry., 142 U. S. 228. Nor is there any limitation on
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the method that the legislature may adopt as a means o.f measuring the tax.
Home Insurance Co. v. New York, 134 U.S. 594 But the tax must be taken
by due process of law and must not become a burden on interstate commerce.
The court in the principal case admits that the state had authority and power
to lay the franchise tax and the authority to control the business within the
state of the foreign corporation and the right to tax the intrastate business
of such corporation carried on as a result of permission to come in. But
though the state has such power it must be exercised so as not to be inconsistent with the Constitution of the United States because the power of the
state legislature is not paramount but subordinate to the U. S. Constitution.
The court hastily disposes of the cases cited by counsel contending that the
statutes are not repugnant to the Constitution of the United States; Baltic
.Mining Co. v. Mass., 231 U. S. 68; St. Louis Southwestern Ry. v. Arkansas,
235 U.S. 350; Kansas City, Memphis Ry. v. Botkin, 240 U.S. 227, by merely
saying "the cases relied upon contain nothing expressly purporting to overrule the pre~ious cases, but on the contrary in explicit terms declared that
they did not conflict with them and that they proceeded upon conditions
peculiar to the particular cases". The court bases its decision upon the substance of the tax, the particular provisions contained therein, the subject matter and the amount. The tax must be of such a character and of such an
amount as not to be a burden upon the corporation's interstate commerce.
Williams v. Talladega, 226 U. S. 404- The instant case shows clearly that the
state can impose a tax-by whatever name it chooses to call it--on a foreign
corporation for the privilege of doing intrastate business and that such a tax
can be measured by the corporation's entire wealth, be it situated wherever
it may, but the amount must not be such as to burden the corporation's interstate business.
CRIMINAL LAw-SEI.F-INCRI:M:INAT10N-CoNSTrtuT10NAL PRovis10Ns-Evi-

DSNcr:.-On the morning after a barn had been burned the sheriff traced
footprints from the barn to a point near defendants' residence, and then
compelled the defendants to walk back with him beside the trail and to
remove their shoes in order that he might compare them with the footprints
found. Defendants were not under arrest, and the sheriff was not acting
under judicial process of any kind. ·Held, that the sheriff's testimony as to
measurement and comparison of tracks thus obtained was admissible and that
its introduction did not violate the constitutional provision against self-incrimination. State v. Barela (N. Mex., 1917), 168 Pac. 545.
The general rule bas long been settled that the admissibility of evidence
is not affected by the manner in which the evidence was obtained. 4 W1cMOR:e ON Evmr:Nce, sec. 2183; Rex v. Granatelli, 7 St. Tr., N. S. 979; State
v. Fuller, 34 Mont. 12. The constitutional provisions against unlawful
searches and seizures and against compulsory self-incrimination are limitations upon this general rule. As to just what is the scope of these limitations the authorities are in confusion. The great weight of authority, however, seems to support the decision in the instant case, which places the test
of admissibility upon "whether the evidence is compulsorily given by the
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defendant under process as a witness". For a discussion of cases involving
the guaranty against unlawful searches and seizures, see 15 MICH. L. Rtv.
65. The cases involving only the limitation against self-incrimination are
numerous. Several involve the situation in which the def~ndant was forced
by one not acting under judicial process to remove his shoes for the purpose of comparison with tracks, and the evidence thereby gained was held
admissible. People v. Van Wormer, 175 N. Y. 188; State v. Fuller, supra;
State v. Arthur, 129 Ia. 235 (But the court assumed that the accused, in jail,
voluntarily gave up his shoes to the sheriff); Krens v. State, 75 Neb. 294;
Magee v. State, 92 Miss. 865 (in which the accused was compelled to put his
foot in a track for the purpose of identification). Contra: Day v. State,
63 Ga. 667; Evans v. State, 1o6 Ga. 519. And if the accused takes off his
shoes for inspection or does some similar act or gives testimony against himself without compulsion or threats, the evidence is doubtless admissible,
since he is then deemed to have waived the benefit of the limitation. Moss
v. State (Ala.). 40 So. 340; State v. Taylor, 202 Mo. I; State v. Fuller, supra.
There is also some authority for the view that if the defendant is compeiled
by legal process to remove his shoes for the purpose of comparison, the evidence is admissible. State v. Graham, 74·N. C. 646; Walker v. State, 7 Tex.
App. 245. The reason governing the prevailing view that testimony secured
by such means as in the instant case is not rendered inadmissible by the provision against self-incrimination is that such testimony is the testimony of
the physical facts and not that of the accused himself. State v. Thompson,
161 N. C. 238; Holt v. United States, 218 U. S. 245.
DIVoRct-EFFEC'r-TuNANCY BY ENTIR£Tms.-Complainant filed a bill for
partition of real estate which had been held by himself and wife as tenants
by the entireties. The defendant, the divorced wife of the complainant, contended that such a tenancy cannot be partitioned. Held, that a decree of
divorce severs the interest of such tenants and they become tenants in common or joint tenants, according to the statutes of the state in which the land
is located. Sbarbaro v. Sbarbaro, (N. J., 1917), 102 Atl. 256.
Only two authorities are cited against the rule thus promulgated namely,
In re Lewis, 85 Mich. 340, and Alles v. Lyon, 216 Pa. St. 6o4, and of these
the effect of the decision in Michigan has been nullified by Sec. II, 437 MICH.
Coll!P. LAws, 1915, providing that divorce changes a tenancy by entireties to
one in common unless otherwise provided in the decree. The Pennsylvania
decision still stands, unaffected by legislation, and expressly followed, as
late as 1912, in Hilt v. Hilt, 50 Pa. Super. Ct. 455. The result in the principal
case is attained on the theory that entirety holdings rest on the fiction of
unity of person, and when this is destroyed, its incidents must of necessity
fail. Additional support is adduced-e converso-from a statement in Coke,
Litt. 187b : "If an estate be made to a man and woman and their heirs, before marriage, and after they marry, the husband and wife have moieties
between them." With the exceptions noted, the instant decision is in harmony with that of courts in other jurisdictions where the same question has
arisen. Though a wife pay out of her personal estate for land conveyed to
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herself and spouse, a divorce merely renders them tenants in common and
she has no equitable claim to the whole, Reed v. Reed, 109 Md. 6go. Community property, including a homestead, was divided by divorce in Speer v.
Sykes, 102 Tex. 451. If in the decree the legal interest is ~ot provided for,
the divorcees take as tenants in common, cf. Joerger v. Joerger, 193 Mo. 133.
It is discretionary in the trial court to award all the property to the husband,
subject to alimony, Brogna v. Brogna, 67 Wash. 687. The tendency would
appear to be general to do away, in the given circumstances, not only with
seisin per tout but also with the incident of survivorship; although, in those
states where a joint tenancy has not yet fallen into disfavor, the severance
may not destroy survivorship, Ames v. Norman, 36 Tenn. (4 Sneed) 683.
Evmr:NCS-DYING Dr:cLARATIONS---0PINION RuLr:.-In the trial on indictment for manslaughter, deceased's wife was permitted to testify for the state
that deceased said, the day after the shooting, "I won't be with you much
longer. I have got to leave you. Oh, Lord, what a pity for Frank McNeil
to shoot a poor boy like I am for nothing! I never done anything to Frank."
Held, error. McNeal v. State, (Miss., 1917), 76 So. 625.
An examination of the numerous decisions on dying declarations in criminal cases shows that the application of the Opinion Rule by the courts has
resulted in great confusion and conflict. See note, 56 L. R. A. 365; note 21
L. R. A. (N. S.) 840. The Opinion Rule has been declared by Wigmore to
have no application to dying declarations "because the Opinion Rule is based
on the theory that wherever the witness can state specifically the detailed
facts observed by him, the inferences to be drawn from them can equally
well be drawn by the jury. But since declarant is here deceased, it is no
longer possible to obtain from him by questions any more detailed data than
his statement may contain, and hence his inferences are not in this instance
superfluous but are indispensable. Nevertheless the courts seem to accept
the Opinion Rule as applicable. 2 W1GMORS ON Evmr:NCS, 1447, and note;
and see note 56 L. R. A. 375. This illogical application of the Opinion Rule
has been overcome in some jurisdictions by the application of the fiction that
the statement sought to be admitted in evidence is not opinion, but a "collective fact". State v. Fielding, 135 Ia. 255; Smith v. State, 133 Ala. 73. On
this theory, while not repudiating the Opinion Rule in name, the Supreme
Court of Mississippi, previous to this case, showed a tendency to follow the
doctrine stated in W1GMORS, (supra). The declarations in Payne v. State,
61 Miss. 161, that "he shot me without any cause whatever;" in Powers v.
State, 74 Miss. 777, "you have killed me without cause;" in Jackso1i v. State,
94 Miss. 8', that the accused killed him for nothing; in House v. State, 94 Miss.
107, 21 L. R. A. (N. S.) 840, that H. had killed him, and killed him without
cause, were all admitted. In the last case the court relied on the section of
W1GM0Rr:, and note cited, supra. Despite the statement of the court in the
principal case that it is not overruling the above cases, it is difficult to see
how a distinction can be based on anything but a barren quibble over terms.
It is a return to the Opinion Rule in toto.
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HoMtSTtAD-SALr:-VAI.IDITY OF CoNTRACT;--INTENT oF STATUTE.-Plaincontracted for the sale of the homestead of which she and her husband
were joint owners, without the husband joining in the contract, but he thereafter confirmed it. The defendant refused to carry out the contract because
of section 6g61, Gi>NERAI. STATUTES, 1913, which provides in part as follows :
-"But if the owner be married, no mortgage of the premises, nor any sale
or other alienation thereof, shall be valid without the signature of both husband and wife." Held, the contract valid and enforci'ble by the plaintiff.
Lennarlz v. Montgomery, (Minn., 1917), 164 N. W. 899.
The defendant contended and the dissenting opinion adopted the same
reasoning, that the contract was absolutely void under the statute, it being
for the sale of the homestead, and the husband not having signed. The cases
cited by the dissenting judges unfortunately, however, presented situations
where the homestead owner was being sued so as to give validity to the contract and enable tlie purchaser to deprive the owner of his homestead. Barton v. Drake, 21 Minn. 299; Law v. Butler, 44 Minn. 482; Weitzner v. Thingstad, 55 Minn. 244- In those cases the courts held that under a statute the
same as the one in question in the instant case, the contracts were not voidable but void. In the principal case the majority held that only the owners
of the homestead were protected by the statute, and that the statute did not
protect the purchaser so as to enable him to repudiate the contract.
t~ff

HUSBAND AND WIFE-CONTRACTS OF MARRIED WOMAN-LAW OF Pl.A.er: OF
CoNTRACT.-Defendant, with her husband, entered into a contract with plaintiff. The contract was made in Oregon and was to be performed there.
Later defendant separated from her husband and removed to Idaho, where
plaintiff sued her on the contract made in Oregon. It was conceded that the
contract was valid in Oregon, and that it would be void if made in Idaho,
where a married woman's right to contract was limited to contracts for her
own use or benefit or in reference to her separate estate. · The controversy
was over the question of whether the courts of Idaho should give effect to
the law of Oregon determining the capacity of a married woman to contract.
Held, that the contract was valid and would be enforced in Idaho. Buncr:,
C. J., dissenting. Meier & Frank Co. v. Bruce (Idaho, 1917), 168 Pac. 5.
The dissenting opinion conceded the general rule that validity is determined by the application of the law of the place of the transaction, if it is
a "voluntary" one, as is a contract. But it was contended that the settled
public policy of Idaho should defeat the application of the rule in the case
of a contra~t made by a married woman. In the prevailing opinion, which
applies the general rule, only two cases are cited in support of the position
taken by the court, and one of these, Milliken v. Pratt, 125 Mass. 374, is not
in point, since there was no settled policy in Massachusetts against a married
woman so contracting. The other case cited, International Harvester Co. v.
McAdam, 142 Wis. u4, involved a situation similar to that of the instant
case, with a similar result. Although the reasoning of the Wisconsin court
(that if the court should refuse to enforce contracts such as are here involved merely because the policy of the state is otherwise, the result would
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be to enforce them only when they would be valid if made in the state of
the forum) would seem sound, yet most of the cases cited by the Wisconsin
court fail to support the decision because no fixed policy was actually violated. Milliken v. Pratt, supra; Bell v. Packard, 6g Me. 105; Bowles v. Field,
78 Fed. 742; Baum v. Birchall, I50 Pa. St. I64; Young v. Hart, IOI Va. 48o.
Furthermore, the statement of the Wisconsin court and of the Idaho court
in the instant case that the exception contended for by the dissenting opinion
applies only where the enforcement of the contract would be pernicious or
grossly immoral is stronger than actually necessary to the decision. On the
other hand, the cases cited in the dissenting opinion are hardly in point, inasmuch as they involve the situation where the married wpman is already domiciled in the state where enforcement is sought, and makes the contract while
out of the state only temporarily. Armstrong v. Best, n2 N. C. 59; First
National Bank v. Shaw, I09 Tenn. 237; Brown v. Dalton, I05 Ky. 66g. See,
too, Union Trust Co. v. Grosman, U. S. S. C. No. 1o6, decided Jan. 7, I918,
In the latter situation there would be good reason for refusing to enforce
the contract, because of the tendency thus to avoid the law of the forum.
The tendency of modern authority appears to be with the prevailing opinion.
International Harvester Co. v. McAdam (I9IO), supra; Barbee & Co. v.
Bevins, Hopkins & Co. (Court of Appeals of Ky., 1917), 195 S. W. I54 (A
case in which the domicile was the state of the forum, the note in question
being governed by the law of West Virginia because the decision was delivered there.); Young v. Bullen (Court of Appeals of Ky., 18g7), 43 S. W.
687. But there is authority contra: Hayden v. Stone, I3 R. I. Io6. Also,
as is conceded in all of the cases cited above, the fact must never be overlooked that the enforcement of contracts made outside the forum depends
wholly upon international comity.
INJUNCTloN-~S'l'RAINING Ust oF NAME AND PICTUat-Crvrr. RIGH'l'S
LAw.-Defendant film manufacturing company used plaintiff's name and picture without her consent, for display in a moving picture film (entitled ''Universal Animated Weekly'', and purporting to represent plaintiff as a woman
lawyer who had solved a murder mystery), and on posters and placards advertising the film, which film defendant marketed and sold for profit. Held,
plaintiff was entitled to an injunction pendente lite, under the Civil Rights
Law (N. Y. CONSOL. LAWS, c. 6) secs. 50 & 5I, prohibiting the use of the
name, portrait, or picture of any living person, without his consent, for advertising or trade purposes, and giving the person, whose name, portrait, or
picture is so used, an equitable action, to restrain such use, and for damages.
Humiston v. Universal Film Mfg. Co. (N. Y. S. C.), 167 N. Y. Supp. g8.
Previous cases involving the interpretation 0°f the above sections of the
New York Civil Rights Law have held: that said statute is a valid and constitutional enactment, Rhodes v. The Sperry & Hutchinson Co., I93 N. Y.
223; that "a picture is not used for 'advertising purposes' within its meaning
unless the picture is part of an advertisement, while 'trade' refers to commerce or traffic, not to dissemination of information", Jeffries v. N. Y. Eve.
lo1mi. Pub. Co., 124 N. Y. Supp. 780; that "the right of privacy under the
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statute cannot be invaded for purposes clearly informative or redemptive",
Almfod v. Sea Beach R·s. Co., 141 N. Y. Supp. 842; that "it would not be
within the evil sought to be remedied by that act to construe it so as to
prohibit the use of the name, portrait, or picture of a living person in truthfully recounting or portraying an actual current event, as is commonly done
in a single issue of a regular newspaper", Binns v. Vitagraph Co., 210 N. Y.
51; that the statute would not be extended to prohibit the publication in the
"NATIONAL PoLICS GAZETTE" of the picture of a lady diver, in costume, and
had never "been so far extended as to prohibit a publication, in a daily, weekly, or periodical paper or magazine, of the portrait of an individual", Colyer
v. Fox Pub. Co., 146 N. Y. Supp. 999. In the instant case, that the publication of the plaintiff's name and picture on the posters and placards of the
defendant was a violation of the statute, as a use for "advertising purposes",
seems clear ; hut, whether the use of her name and picture in the film was
a violation of the statute, presents a more difficult question. The court held
that such use was for "purposes of trade", that the film was used in defendant's regular business, for purposes of profit, and any dissemination of
current news of the day was purely incidental; that the fact that defendant's
film was a series of photographs of actual current events, produced and distributed weekly, and used as soon as possible after the occurrence of the
events, did not make it a newspaper, 'or bring it within the protection extended to newspapers by the cases of ·Colyer v. Fox Pub. Co., supra, and
Jeffries v. N. Y. Eve. Journ. Pub. Co., S11pra,· that there was "a clear distinction between merely incidental and fortuitous use of an individual's picture as an incident to some important public event, and the exploitation of
that individual as the important and central part of an event which is not of
real public importance, however great may be the public interest therein".
lNSURANCE-RISK-CoLOR BLIND:N'ESS-COMPLF.TE AND PERMANENT Loss
oF SIGHT oF BOTH Ens.-In an action on an insurance policy, held, that color
blindness sustained by a railway trainman, which disqualified him from
service is to be construed as the complete and permanent loss of sight of
both eyes. Routt v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen (Neb.), 165 N. W.
141.
The policy states that any member who shall suffer the complete and
permanent loss of sight of both eyes shall be entitled to receive the full
amount of his beneficiary certificate. The case involves the determination
of what is a complete and permanent loss of sight. A dissenting opinion in
this case by three justices stated, "To insure a person's ability to permanently
continue in his particular vocation would, in a policy require words to that
effect''. A railway night switchman becoming color blind during his employment was held to be thereby disabled by sickness within the meaning of
his employer's contract that they will pay him sick benefits for a limited time
while he is disabled by sickness or accidental injury. Kane v. Chicago, Burlington a11d Q11facy Railroad Compa11y, 90 Neb. II2. In this case the court
said, "The plaintiff for the purpose of his vocation is blind, and, being blind
is sick within the meaning of the defendant regulations". Incurable blind-
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ness is sickness within the meaning of the English Statute. Regina v. Buck11ell, 77 E. C. L. 585. There are but few if any reported cases involving the
question in this case. The holding goes pretty far and if it can be supported
it must be on the grounds that the contract of insurance is construed most
strongly against the insurer and that the defendant did business principally
with railroad men.
INTOXICATING LIQuoRs-STATUTt-CoNsTRuCTION oi? Tn WoB.D "Ho:M~"
Defendant stored two barrels of cider in an outhouse, situated at a distance of
about eighty feet from the dwelling house in which there was no available
space for storing the barrels. Molasses, apples, and other foods intended for
the use of the family were also kept in this outhouse. Under the Mapp Prohibition Law, (ACTS, I9I6, p. 2I6,) defendant was convicted for giving away
cider taken from the barrels in the outhouse. Section 16 of the above law
prohibited the giving away of ardent spirits in any place "except in a bona
fide home"; section 6I provided that nothing in the law should prevent one
"in his own home" from having and giving to another ardent spirits. The
trial court refused to instruct the jury that the word "home" as used in the
law was intended to include the curtilage, the whole cluster of buildings
used by the family as a habitation. Held, the instruction should have been
given. Bare v. Commonwealth (Va., I9I7), 94 S. E. I68.
The construction 6f the statute adopted by the Supreme Court of Appeals
seems in accord not only with the common understanding and acceptance
of the term "home" as the place of residence rather than any particular
building which may be at that spot, but also in accord with the construction
of similar expressions as found in the common and statute law referring
to arson, burglary and analogous crimes. For instance, in construing a statute prohibiting the carrying of weapons outside the "home", the court held
that "home" included buildings necessarily appurtenant to the dwelling house.
Coker v. Stote, I2 Ga. App. 425. An outhouse within the curtilage was considered a part of the "dwelling house" as regards the law of arson. People
v. Taylor, 2 Mich. 250; Page v. Commonwealth, 26 Grat. (Va.) 943. An indictment for the burglary of a dwelling was sustained by proof of the breaking and entering of a barn eight rods in the rear of the house. Pitcher v.
People, 16 Mich. I42. A game of cards played about ten feet from a tent
used as private residence was played "at the residence" within the meaning
of a statute prohibiting gaming at any place except at a private residence.
Hipp v. State, 45 Tex. Cr. App. 200.
The killing of a man in a building
thirty-six feet from the accused's house was considered justified as in defense of his habitation. Pond v. People, 8 Mich. ISO. See also 2 BISHOP,
CRIMINAL LAW, Ed. 7, § I04LIBEL .... ND SLANDER-PRIVILEGED Co:M.MUNICATIONS.-While the defendant
was presenting a claim against the plaintiff in the regular course of business,
he was shown the books of the company. He communicated the information
thus obtained to a credit company of which he was correspondent along with
his opinion that concerted action by the creditors was necessary. The infor-
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mation, which was slightly incorrect, was sent to the plaintiff's creditors.
They stopped credit, thereby causing the plaintiff inconvenience, but he was
not insolvent and did not become so. Held, that the communication was privileged. Simons v. Petersberger (Ia., 1917), 165 N. W. 91.
The general rule was followed in considering the communication "qualifiedly privileged", thus making proof of the defendant's bad faith requisite
to the plaintiff's success. Bohlinger v. Germania Life bis. Co., 100 Ark. 477,
36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 449. Defendant, though his communication was not an
answer to an inquiry, had at least a duty of imperfect obligation in regard
to the matter. Caldwell v. Story, 107 Ky. 10. The information seems, also,
to have reached only interested subscribers thus avoiding cases where the
information reached outsiders or was sent to all the subscribers irrespective
of interest. Pacific Packing Co. v. Bradstreet Co., 25 Idaho 5¢, Ann. Cas.
1916 D, 76!. To reach its conclusion, the distinction between information
furnished a credit company by its agent and information furnished by it to
its members had to be ignored. Sherwood v. Gilbert, 2 Alb. L. J. 323. Contra: State e:r rel. Lanning v. Lonsdale, 48 Wis. 348. Even then, the result
is in conflict with several cases holding that such communications though
given after a special request are not privileged. Macintosh v. Dun (1go8),
A. C. 390; Johnson v. Bradstreet Co., 77 Ga. 172.
MAsTr:R AND Sr:RvANT-L1ABILITY FOR Ntcr.1GENCE-H£AD oF FAMn.y's
AUTOMOBII.£ OPERATED BY M:r:MBER oF FAllUI.Y.-Defendant purchased and
owned an automobile for family use, giving his wife general permission to
use it whenever and wherever she desired. While the wife was driving the
machine for her own pleasure, accompanied by a lady friend, it collided with
a motorcycle on which the plaintiff was riding, injuring the latter. Held,
that the defendant husband was liable for his wife's alleged negligence, on
the ground that she was his agent. Hutchins v. Haffner (Colo., 1917), 167
Pac. g66. Defendant purchased and owned an automobile for family use,
giving his daughter, a minor; permission to use it. While the daughter was
driving the machine for her own pleasure, accompanied by a friend, it
struck and injured the plaintiff. Held, that the defendant father was not
liable for his daughter's alleged negligence, she not being his agent. Blair
v. Broadwater (Va., 1917), 93 S. E. 632.
The decisions bearing upon the liability of an owner of an automobile,
kept for family use, for the negligence of a member of his family, in driving
the machine with his consent, are squarely in conflict, as illustrated by the
principal cases. Cases following the doctrine of Hutchins v. Haffner, supra,
are: Birch v. Abercombie, 74 Wash. 486; McNeal v. McKain, 33 Okla. 449;
Guignon v. Campbell, 8o Wash. 543; Griffin v. Ru,,sell, 144 Ga. 275. Cases
following the doctrine of Blair v. Broadwater, supra, are~ Doran v. Thomsen, 76 N. J. L. 754; Tanzer v. Read, 145 N. Y. Supp. 7o8; Parker v. Wilson,
179 Ala. 361; Van Blaricom v. Dodgson, 220 N. Y. III. Where one person
is sought to be charged with the negligence or wrongdoing of another, the
doctrine of respondeat superior applies only when the relation of master
and servant is shown to exist between the wrongdoer and the person sought
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to be charged, at the time of, and in respect to, the very transaction out of
which the injury arose. Forsyth v. Hooper, II Allen (Mass.) 419; Wood
v. Cobb, 13 Allen (Mass.) 58; Wyllie v. Palmer, 137 N. Y. 248 (257); Woon,
MASTER AND SERVANT, p. IO, sec. 7. No presumption of the relation of master and servant results from the mere fact of the domestic relationship.
Maddo~ v. Brow11, 71 Me. 432; M'Calla v. Wood, 2 N. J. L. 86; Kumba v.
Gilham, 103 \Vis. 3I2; ScHOULER, DOMESTIC RELATIONS, sec. 263; THOMPSON,
NEGLIGENCE, sec. 537. The cases which hold the owner of an automobile
liable as· master argue that the machine was purchased and operated for
family use; that, at the time of the accident, the driver was engaged in carrying out the general purpose for which the machine was bought and kept;
that, as it was taken out at the time in pursuance of authority from the
owner to take it for the pleasure of the family, and the driver, as a member
of it, the driver was engaged in the exercise of the owner's businrss,-supplying of recreation to members of the family. Cases taking the opposite
view attempt to meet this line of argument by saying that such reasoning
bases the creation of the relation of master and servant upon the purpose
which the owner·had in mind in acquiring the ownership of the automobile,
and its permitted use by the driver, ignoring an essential element in the creation of that status, as to third persons, viz.: that such use must have been
in the furtherance of, and not apart from, the master's service and control;
that it interdicts the owner's generosity, and his reasonable care for the pleasure, and even the well-being, of the members of his family, by imposing a
universal responsibility for their acts; that it fails to distinguish between a
mere permission to use, and a use subject to the control of the master and
connected with his affairs. The doctrine supported by the case of Hutchins
v. Haffner, supra, seems to be founded more on a desire to insure a remedy
to parties injured by the negligence of drivers of automobiles, by fixing the
liability on someone financially responsible, and to avoid setting a premium
on the failure of the owner to employ a competent chauffeur, than upon any
logical application of the privileges involved in the relationship of master
and servant.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-TRAFFIC ORDINANCE.-An ordinance of the city
of Cleveland provided that "in case of accident to or collision with a person
* * *, the person so driving or operating such vehicle shall stop and give
such reasonable assistance as can be given * * *''. Appellant was arrested
and charged with violation of above ordinance in that she failed to render
such reasonable assistance as could be given after her automobile knocked
down A. Held, the ordinance was invalid for indefiniteness in that it failed
to use the words "knowingly" or words of similar import. Second, that it
took the time and money of a citizen without substantial compensation
whether he is to blame or i.lameless for the injury. Third, that the ordinance
fixed no standard of what constitutes reasonable assistance. Henry v. Cleveland (Ohio Ct. App., 1917), 39 Oh. C. C. 165.
The protection of life and limb is a matter of public concern and there
is both power and obligation to pass and enforce reasonable police provisions.
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Every ordinance must be definite and certain in its terms. MAcQurr.r.AN,
MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES, Sec. 651. In the instant case the court pointed out
three particular reasons why the ordinance was indefinite. In the case of
the food laws and SWiday closing laws, the failure to require lmowledge on
the part of the offender is not a mark of uncertainty. The court, however,
distinguishes those cases by pointing out that the offender has control over
the subject matter and can protect himself, while in this case the court was
able to conceive of a situation, which, though highly improbable, was not
within his control. The second reason seems to ignore the right of the
state to take a limited amount of the property of blameless individuals by
an exercise of the police power. Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U. S. 104.
The third reason is also very doubtful when considered in the light of those
cases following "the rule of reason" laid down by the court in The Standard
Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U. S. I. In a very recent case in Ohio, not
referred to, the Supreme Court held that a statute is valid if it is as definite
and certain on the subject matter and the numerous situations arising thereunder, as the nature of the case and safety of the public will reasonably
admit. State v. Schaeffer (Ohio), II7 N. E. 220.
PUBLIC OIIIIIC!>RS-S'l'A'l't ~sURSR-LIAlln.I'l'Y FoR IN'l'ERES'l' oN FUNDS.
-Defendant, a state treasurer, deposited in banks from time to time the
funds received by him as treasurer and collected the interest for himself.
Held, such treasurer is not entitled to interest. State v. Schamber (S. Dak.,
1917), 165 N. W. 241.
There is a direct conflict of authorities on this question. In almost all
of the adjudicated cases, courts recognize the fundamental proposition that
interest is but an increment and goes with the principal. In a number of
jurisdictions the question has been made to depend upon whether the relation
of the treasurer to the state was that of debtor and creditor or whether it
was that of trustee and cestui que trust. Perhaps the leading case supporting
the view that the relation is that of debtor and creditor is State v. W alsen,
I; Colo. 170, which holds that a state treasurer who has received public
money by virtue of his office is not liable for interest received on that money
in the absence of a statutory provision to that effect. A county treasurer
receives money as his own and cannot be required to account for and pay
over amounts collected or received as interest on such money. · Shelton v.
The State, 53 Ind. 331. A public official is not chargeable with interest on
the public funds in his hands although he may have received interest, unless
he is required by law to place it in some safe depository as the money of
the state. Commonwealth v. Goldshaw, 92 Ky. 435. A county treasurer is a
special baile~ and there can be no recovery of interest received by him after
he has gone out of office. •Waloy v. Bd. of Cormty Commissioners, Bernalillo,
IO N. M. 638. The weight of authority, however, supports what seems to be
the better view, that the interest which attaches to the principal belongs to
the state and on failure to account for this the officer or his sureties may be
held liable. This rule is applied notwithstanding the fact that the officer's
liability was held or assumed to be absolute. Adams v. Williams, 97 Miss.
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u3. The leading case on this side of the question is State v. McFetridge,
84 Wis. 473, where all the authorities are reviewed. The supporting cases
hold that it is a complete non sequitur to say that because a public officer
who has charge of public funds is an absolute insurer, he therefore is entitled
to the accruing interest thereon. A county treasurer is liable ·to the county
for interest received on deposits of county funds. His liability arises not
only from his fiduciary relations but from the fact that the interest belongs
to the county and comes into his hands by virtue of his office. Richmond
County Supervisors v. Wandel, 6 Lans. (N. Y.) 33. Instead of being the
debtor of the district, he is its treasurer; the custodian of its funds ; and he
acquires custody of the funds without acquiring title to them. Eshelby v.
Cincinnati Ed. of Education, 66 Ohio St. 7r. A public officer is not entitled
to interest on funds received by virtue of his office. The true test is not
whether he is absolutely liable to account but whether he is the owner of th~
funds in his hands. Rhea v. Brewster, 130 Ia. 729.
TAXA'rION-INcoM~ TAX-ROYALT:ms 011 M~s AS INcoH~-Dsl'UCIATION.

-Plaintiff corporation leased two iron mines, the lessees agreeing to pay
certain specified royalties annually on the ore taken out. The Wisconsin Income Tax Law, LAWS 19u, c. 658, I, provided that "income" as used "in the
act should include "all rent of real estate", and permitted a reasonable deduction for depreciation of property from which the income was derived.
Under this act taxes were collected on the royalties received by the plaintiff,
but no deduction was allowed for the depletion of the ore deposits. This
action was brought to recover the taxes paid under protest. Held, that no
recovery should be allowed. Pfister Land ComP<my v. Milwaukee (Wis.,
19r7), 165 N. W. 23.
In holding that the value of the ore as it leaves the mine was income and
not converted capital, and therefore that the royalties paid by the lessees to
the owners were to be regarded as rents within the meaning of the Income
Tax Law, the Wisconsin court has relied expressly upon the authority of
Von Baumbach v. Sargent Land Company, 242 U. S. 503, and State v. Royal
Mineral Association, r32 Minn. 232. The fundamental principle upon which
these holdings are based seems to be as follows : that the land itself is the
chief thing, that mining is one of the productive uses of which the land is
capable, and that the product of that use should be called income. In a
case recently decided in the Circuit Court of Appeals, Biwabick Mining
Compan~l v. U. S., 243 Fed. 9, it was held that, from the lessee's standpoint,
receipts from the sale of ore represented conversion of capital assets and
did not constitute taxable income. This case has now been carried up for
review by the Supreme Court. The position for which the appellant contended in the principal case, that the contract between the parties is not accurately speaking a lease but a sale of a part of the corpus of the property,
has been approved by the English courts and has found some support in this
country. Coltness Iron Company v. Black, 6 A. C. 3r5; Stoughton's Appeal,
88 Pa. g8; Blakley v. Marshall, I74 Pa. 425; Wilson v. Youst, 43 W. Va. 826.
Its further contention that the extraction of the ore is an exhaustion of the
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capital, and hence depreciation, is not without logical foundation in economic
theory. In Earl of Derby v. Aylmer [1915], 3 K. B. 374, a somewhat analogous question was raised concerning a tax which was imposed on the income
which the Earl received from the services of two stallions for breeding purposes. He claimed a deduction as depreciation for the annual loss in value
of the horses, computed on the probable length of time during which they
could be used for the above purposes. In rejecting the Earl's claim, the
court emphasized a consideration which is of prime importance in dealing
with cases arising under income tax laws-while such contentions may be
sound from an accountant's point of view, courts must be governed by the
intention of the legislature.
TAXATlON-!NH!>RITANCS TAx-DowJ>R.-The State attempted to collect
inheritance tax on a dower interest allotted to a widow, upon her dissent from
testator's will. A statute provided that all real and personal property which
passes by will or intestate laws of the state from any person who may die
seized of the same should be subject to an inheritance tax, allowing, however,
exemptions in favor of a widow and children for certain amounts. Held,
dower is property which passes by the intestate laws of the State. Corporati01i Commission et al v. Dunn et al (N. C., 1917), 94 S. E. 481.
The weight of authority is represented by the recent case of In re Bullen's
Estate (Utah, 1915), 151 Pac. 533, \V~ich holds that dower passes to the
widow as of her own right by purchase and not by "intestate laws". In re
Weiler's Estate, 122 N. Y. S. 6o8; In re Shield's Estate (N. Y.) 68 Misc. 264;
Crenshaw v. Moore, 124 Tenn. 528; Commonwealths Appeal, 34 Pa. .2040nly one case can be found which supports the theory of the principal case
that dower is inherited and is subject to an inheritance tax. Billings v. People, 189 Ill. 472. In the concurring opinion it was urged that the intention
of the legislature, as shown by the history of legislation on the subject and
the changes made by the act in question whereby the widow was allowed an
exemption, was that dower should come within the meaning of the phrase
"intestate la\vs of the State". But the dissenting opinion maintained the view
that the fact, that the widow is allowed an exemption where none was allowed before, does not show that her dower is taxable as she may derive
personal property from her husband under the intestacy law as one of the
distributees, and to this the ex~mption would apply, and not to property
already made not taxable by the language of the statute.
·
WILI.s-CoNTRACT To OPtRATS ON DSATH.-An action in assumpsit was
brought alleging that defendant promised plaintiff's decedent in writing to pay
plaintiff $275 for the interest of dec~dent in the business in which decedent
and defendant were engaged, in case defendant should survive, that the consideration for the promise was the agreement of decedent that defendant
should have the business in that event, and that defendant took possession on
the death of his partner. Held, no cause of action was stated; because the
transaction alleged was testamentary, not contractual, and retaining possession
proved nothing, because a surviving partner is entitled to do so. Ferrara v.
Russo (R. I., 1917), 102 Atl. 86.
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In reaching this conclusion the court relied on the cases which hold that
the test to determine whether a transaction is testamentary, is whether rights
are to arise on the death of the maker of the instrument or on the execution
of it Admitting that this test is sound, as no doubt it is, it is submitted that
it is wholly misapplied in the instant case. True, the defendant's right and his
liability to pay were to become absolute upon survivorship, an event that would
happen, if at all, on the death of the plaintiff's decedent; hut on the execution of the instrument he acquired a vested right to take on a future contingency, which the decedent could not defeat by revocation, a feature wholly
inconsistent with a testamentary disposition, and one of the primary objects
of the contract was to give the defendant this indefeasible right A wi11 is a
disposition to take effect on the death of the disposer, not an acquisition to
take effect on the death of the acquirer. Even a liability to pay to arise on
the death of the obliger is not testamentary. Eisenlohr's Est. (Pa. Sup. Ct.
1917), 102 Atl. IIS, a promise by a partner to pay on his death.

